Dying To Win: The Strategic Logic Of Suicide Terrorism

by Robert A. Pape
New York: Random House, 2006
261 pages

Reviewed by Captain Michael H. Gough

In the rapidly expanding field of study on suicide terrorism, Dying to Win presents a detailed and well-organized analysis which challenges the widely accepted notion that Islamic radicalism is the principal cause. Originally published in 2005, the paperback edition from 2006 includes a new afterword.

Pape argues persuasively that three causal conditions must exist in order for a suicide terrorism campaign to be launched: First, a circumstance of national resistance to foreign occupation of lands strongly associated with a nationalist identity; second, the occupying force originates from a democracy or democracies; and third, there is a difference in religion between those being occupied and those doing the occupying. Furthermore, suicide operations are shown not to be isolated or random incidents executed by singular fanatics, but rather, they form part of lucidly planned terrorist campaigns with specific strategic goals in mind. This book studies, from a global perspective, the phenomenon of modern suicide terrorism that has now spanned the last 25 years.

Early in the book, Pape, after a brief historical review, narrowly defines the concept of suicide terrorism in order to exclude other notable suicide campaigns, such as those conducted by the 11th and 12th Century Ismali assassins, and the Japanese kamikazes. This allows him to focus on suicide terrorism as we experience it today. Part One discusses the strategic logic of suicide terrorism, explaining how it has become a key weapon in the arsenal of otherwise militarily weak protagonists, such as terrorists. Part Two explores the social logic of this phenomenon, and how societies are persuaded, by the perpetrating organizations, to believe that suicide terrorism is a legitimate means to attain national liberation, and that the suicide terrorists themselves are martyrs. Finally, Part Three sheds new light onto the individual logic of suicide terrorism by challenging the idea that suicide terrorists are suicidal in the traditional sense, offering instead that they are more likely motivated by altruistic intentions. Pape also demonstrates that only a minority of suicide attackers can be considered religious fanatics.

Although it is difficult to grapple with the notion of suicide terrorism as a logical means of coercion, Pape illustrates how terrorist organizations have perceived the success of suicide terrorism in the past. Several suicide campaigns have led to visible concessions or full-scale withdrawal of occupying forces, an example being the extraction of American, French, and Israeli forces from Lebanon in the early 1980s. Whether these actions on the part of the occupying entity were in direct response to the suicide campaign is shown to be irrelevant, since they have further fuelled terrorist justifications to conduct future suicide attacks as a logical and effective scheme to achieve their goals.

In order to demonstrate his theory, Pape investigates four suicide terrorism campaigns in detail. By examining the use of suicide terrorism by Hamas in Lebanon, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam resistance to Sri Lanka, the Sikhs against India after the Golden Temple Massacre, and the Parti Karkaren Kurdistan against Turkey, he lays a solid foundation for his three-pronged causal argument. Even without the author’s comprehensive analysis, the detailed appendices and frequent tables provide the reader with ample data on suicide attacks conducted over the past 25 years, up to 2005, with the publication of the hardcover first edition.

The main drawback experienced by this reader throughout the body of the text was that some of the meticulous statistical deductions described are rather complex, and sometimes circuitous. Although the author makes excellent use of tables and graphs to illustrate his interpretations of the data, the supporting prose is, at times, not easy to grasp initially. However, Pape’s thorough argumentative style generally anticipates his critics’ impending questions, and he responds to them in detail. This lends further credence to his theory, and it offers the reader confidence in his analysis.

However, the Canadian observer, in particular, will note the lack of analysis concerning escalating suicide terrorism in Afghanistan. This is most likely due to the relatively recent upsurge in suicide attacks in that country, which coincided too closely to initial publication of the book for inclusion. However, Pape’s analytical model, as outlined, could be similarly applied and tested using updated statistics from Afghanistan.

In his conclusion and afterword, Pape suggests that the only way to end suicide terrorism in Iraq is for complete and immediate withdrawal of American and Allied forces from the Arabian Peninsula. His explanations into this decision are disappointingly brief, and his afterword does not include any references. This is particularly surprising considering that throughout his book, but particularly in Chapter 5, he argues that one of the main reasons that suicide terrorism has proliferated recently is the perception on the part of terrorists of the probable success of suicide campaigns for achieving their immediate strategic goals. These are usually the withdrawal of combat forces generated and deployed by a democracy. Clearly, if we follow the author’s logic and arguments, if western forces were to withdraw without delay from Iraq, and, by extension, Afghanistan, this would be perceived as nothing short of a total victory for suicide terrorism operations on the part of the terrorists. And it would serve to increase the future use of such tactics. It would be interesting to know how Pape reached this conclusion, in spite of this obvious contradiction in the book.

Dying to Win is an important read for anyone who seeks to know more about the phenomenon of suicide terrorism and its logical effectiveness from the perspective of terrorist organizations. Not only is it well-organized and thought-provoking, but his analytical model can be applied to and tested against future cases.

Source: Canadian Military Journal

Captain Gough, an armoured officer and member of Lord Strathcona’s Horse, is currently the Regular Support Staff Officer with the British Columbia Dragoons.

This review should be read in conjunction with an earlier post Who, Exactly, is the Enemy?

A related article in the Canadian Military Journal which also addresses the issue of suicide attackers may be accessed here.

General McChrystal's Afghanistan Report

Below are a couple of extracts from the Report which emphasize its primary focus: The need to protect the Afghan civilian population both from insurgent attacks and from unintended, but disastrous, ISAF fire gone awry; and to restore the Afghan people's confidence in their government.

New Operational Culture: Population-centric COIN.

ISAF must operate differently. Preoccupied with force protection, ISAF has operated in a manner that distances itself, both physically and psychologically, from the people they seek to protect. The Afghan people have paid the price, and the mission has been put at risk. ISAF, with the ANSF, must shift its approach to bring security and normalcy to the people and shield them from insurgent violence, corruption and coercion, ultimately enabling GlRoA to gain the trust and confidence of the people while reducing the influence of insurgents. Hard eamed credibility and face to face relationships, rather than close combat, will achieve success. This requires enabling Afghan counterparts to meet the needs of the people at the community level through dynamic partnership., engaged leadership, de centralized decision making, and a fundamental shift In priorities.

Improve Undestanding: ISAF military and civilian personnel alike must acquire a far better understanding of Afghanistan and its people. ISAF personnel must be seen as guests of the Afghan people and their government, not an occupying army. Key personnel in ISAF must receive training in local languages. Tour lengths should be long enough to build continuity and ownership of success. All ISAF personnei must show respect for local cultures and customs and demonstrate intellectual curiosity about the people of Afghanistan. The United States should fully implement and encourage other nations to emulate the “Afghan Hands” program that recruits and maintains a cadre of military and civilian practitioners and outside experts with deep knowledge of Afghanistan.

Build Relationships: In order to be successful as counterinsurgents, ISAF must alter its operational culture to focus on building personal relationships with its Afghan partners and the protected population. To gain accurate Information and intelligence about the local environment, ISAF must spend as much time as possible with the people and as little time as possible in armored vehicles or behind the walls of forward operating bases. ISAF personnel must seek out, understand, and act to address the needs and grievances of the people in their local environment. Strong personal relationships forged between security forces and local populations will be a key to success.



Two Main Threats: Insurgency and Crisis In Confldence

The ISAF mission faces two principal threats and is also subject to the influence of external actors.

The first threat Is the existence of organized and determined insurgent groups working to expel international forces, separate the Afghan people from GlRoA, and gain control of the population.

The second threat, of a very different kind, is the crisis of popular confidence that springs from the weakness of GlRoA institutions, the unpunished abuse of power by corrupt officials and power brokers, a widespread sense of political disenfranchisement, and a longstanding lack of economic opportunity. ISAF errors have further compounded the problem. These factors generate recruits for the insurgent groups, elevate local conflicts and power broker disputes to a national level, degrade the people's security and quality of life, and undermine international will.

Addressing the external actors will enable success; however, insufficiently addressing either principal threat will result in failure.

Ubiquitous Computing Again

The Media Lab at MIT is working on a remarkable device that would enable soldiers to immediately and seamlessly access all extant information relevant to their current situation. (Talk about "situation awareness"!) You can see it demonstrated on this website. The device has been named 'SixthSense' and "is a wearable gestural interface that augments the physical world around us with digital information and lets us use natural hand gestures to interact with that information."

"The SixthSense prototype implements several applications that demonstrate the usefulness, viability and flexibility of the system. The map application lets the user navigate a map displayed on a nearby surface using hand gestures, similar to gestures supported by Multi-Touch based systems, letting the user zoom in, zoom out or pan using intuitive hand movements. The drawing application lets the user draw on any surface by tracking the fingertip movements of the user’s index finger. SixthSense also recognizes user’s freehand gestures (postures). For example, the SixthSense system implements a gestural camera that takes photos of the scene the user is looking at by detecting the ‘framing’ gesture. The user can stop by any surface or wall and flick through the photos he/she has taken. SixthSense also lets the user draw icons or symbols in the air using the movement of the index finger and recognizes those symbols as interaction instructions. For example, drawing a magnifying glass symbol takes the user to the map application or drawing an ‘@’ symbol lets the user check his mail. The SixthSense system also augments physical objects the user is interacting with by projecting more information about these objects projected on them. For example, a newspaper can show live video news or dynamic information can be provided on a regular piece of paper. The gesture of drawing a circle on the user’s wrist projects an analog watch." Quotation source.