General McChrystal's Afghanistan Report

Below are a couple of extracts from the Report which emphasize its primary focus: The need to protect the Afghan civilian population both from insurgent attacks and from unintended, but disastrous, ISAF fire gone awry; and to restore the Afghan people's confidence in their government.

New Operational Culture: Population-centric COIN.

ISAF must operate differently. Preoccupied with force protection, ISAF has operated in a manner that distances itself, both physically and psychologically, from the people they seek to protect. The Afghan people have paid the price, and the mission has been put at risk. ISAF, with the ANSF, must shift its approach to bring security and normalcy to the people and shield them from insurgent violence, corruption and coercion, ultimately enabling GlRoA to gain the trust and confidence of the people while reducing the influence of insurgents. Hard eamed credibility and face to face relationships, rather than close combat, will achieve success. This requires enabling Afghan counterparts to meet the needs of the people at the community level through dynamic partnership., engaged leadership, de centralized decision making, and a fundamental shift In priorities.

Improve Undestanding: ISAF military and civilian personnel alike must acquire a far better understanding of Afghanistan and its people. ISAF personnel must be seen as guests of the Afghan people and their government, not an occupying army. Key personnel in ISAF must receive training in local languages. Tour lengths should be long enough to build continuity and ownership of success. All ISAF personnei must show respect for local cultures and customs and demonstrate intellectual curiosity about the people of Afghanistan. The United States should fully implement and encourage other nations to emulate the “Afghan Hands” program that recruits and maintains a cadre of military and civilian practitioners and outside experts with deep knowledge of Afghanistan.

Build Relationships: In order to be successful as counterinsurgents, ISAF must alter its operational culture to focus on building personal relationships with its Afghan partners and the protected population. To gain accurate Information and intelligence about the local environment, ISAF must spend as much time as possible with the people and as little time as possible in armored vehicles or behind the walls of forward operating bases. ISAF personnel must seek out, understand, and act to address the needs and grievances of the people in their local environment. Strong personal relationships forged between security forces and local populations will be a key to success.



Two Main Threats: Insurgency and Crisis In Confldence

The ISAF mission faces two principal threats and is also subject to the influence of external actors.

The first threat Is the existence of organized and determined insurgent groups working to expel international forces, separate the Afghan people from GlRoA, and gain control of the population.

The second threat, of a very different kind, is the crisis of popular confidence that springs from the weakness of GlRoA institutions, the unpunished abuse of power by corrupt officials and power brokers, a widespread sense of political disenfranchisement, and a longstanding lack of economic opportunity. ISAF errors have further compounded the problem. These factors generate recruits for the insurgent groups, elevate local conflicts and power broker disputes to a national level, degrade the people's security and quality of life, and undermine international will.

Addressing the external actors will enable success; however, insufficiently addressing either principal threat will result in failure.